Federico Alagna on how cities and civil society can drive radical reform of EU migration policy.
The promotion of a deep change in EU migration and asylum policies requires a new centrality for those actors, such as city governments and civil society organisations, that, while currently not pivotal in migration governance, have the desire and the ability to play a crucial role in such change.
The promotion of a deep change in EU migration and asylum policies requires a new centrality for those actors, such as city governments and civil society organisations, that, while currently not pivotal in migration governance, have the desire and the ability to play a crucial role in such change. In the ongoing (and problematic) discussion of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and in light of the upcoming 2024 European election, current and would-be members of the next European Parliament with a progressive agenda on migration may find a deeper knowledge of these actors, and a closer and more stable engagement with them, particularly fruitful. This is especially the case in terms of strengthening the role of the progressive members of the European assembly in this subject matter.
More specifically, current Members of the European Parliament and candidates at the 2024 European election who intend to deeply reform the existing EU approach to migration – in a way that is more inclined to ensure mobility, safety and human rights – should consider the opportunities offered by developing partnerships with city governments and civil society organisations that are already working together on the issue. This approach could enable them to strengthen their connection within and across territories, to stimulate inter-institutional and inter-party cooperation and to spur the engagement of civil society in the EU policy arena, in an attempt to have an impact on the safeguarding of human rights and freedom of movement in the EU.
Political Will
Migration has for some time been one of the most salient and divisive issues in EU public opinion and among policy-makers. Although temporary periods of cohesion and (almost) unanimous mourning can be observed when major tragedies occur, EU citizens and political elites have adopted extremely diverse – and highly politicised – stances on the phenomenon. The more migration has become a salient issue, the more its governance has been harshly debated, which in turn has favoured the emergence of different points of view and their polarisation. Remarkable examples of this that have taken place over the past number of years are the proposed reform of the Dublin III Regulation, which was eventually blocked by deadlocks in the Council of the European Union (the Council) in 2019, or the border, asylum and migration management externalisation agreements that were concluded with third countries, such as the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement.
More recently, we have seen a similar trend in the ongoing discussion surrounding the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (the Migration Pact). Overall, however, these divisive and intense debates have not been paralleled by a similar variety in policy approaches and outcomes. Notwithstanding, several (mostly left-wing) Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have continuously attempted to inform EU migration policy in a way that is more compliant to human rights and international law. But despite significant internal and cross-country divides, an attentive look at both EU and national migration policies over the last number of decades reveals an overall homogenous approach – and continuity over time – based on three main pillars: (a) restrictive migration policies; (b) the criminalisation of people on the move and of those who assist them; (c) the externalisation of border, asylum and migration management to third countries. That this continues to be the case is clearly confirmed by the latest evidence on the Migration Pact.
In this context, the wave of solidarity towards those fleeing Ukraine, which spread across the continent in the aftermath of the Russian invasion, was the exception, rather than the rule. Member state (MS) governments, civil society organisations and citizens competed with one another to appear as welcoming champions and to publicly and fully express their solidarity with those fleeing Ukraine. Remarkably, Council Directive 2001/55/EC (the Temporary Protection Directive) was also activated for the first time in EU history. Such unprecedented efforts can be explained in light of several distinctive aspects of the situation, such as the background political confrontation between the EU and Russia – which made the politics of welcoming an important soft power tool – and the characteristics of the people on the move (white, women and children). The difference between such mobilisation and the persistent restrictive approach displayed, among other places, at the EU Mediterranean borders – often times with tragic consequences, as in the recent devastating shipwreck off Pylos on14 June 2023 – is striking. Overall, the Ukrainian situation has openly demonstrated that a quick, non-bureaucratic response to large inflows of people on the move is possible – it is but a matter of political will.
While the Parliament has become an ambiguous actor in this policy domain, others – though not tasked with any direct legislative responsibility – have consistently and strongly advocated for a more humane EU migration policy, and even for a radical change in the mobility regime. City governments and civil society organisations (CSOs) have been among those who have most strongly engaged in such advocacy, both separately and by establishing a productive dialogue and launching important joint initiatives. As the campaign for the 2024 European Parliament election is about to start, this policy brief illustrates why city governments and civil society organisations can be important allies for current and would-be MEPs who wish to pursue a more open human mobility regime and a migration policy that complies with both human rights and international law.
The centrality of cities
States (and, to a lesser extent, supranational and international bodies) are the ones that make migration and asylum policies. On the other hand, however, people on the move do not live in an abstract national or supranational space, but rather in physical places which constitute ‘the local’, such as cities. This means that while governments make migration policy, it is cities that develop reception and integration practices.
This situation explains, among other things, how and why cities have increasingly become a key actor in defining mobility regimes. Remarkably, their increased respoilities have also led them to claim a more central role in the making of migration and asylum policy. Examples of a proactive engagement by cities in these policy domains have spread consistently across Europe over the last decade.
At the same time, cities have also started to develop their own migration governance frameworks, promoting inclusive policies and distancing themselves from the repressive and restrictive approaches adopted by the EU and national governments. The research and dissemination project Moving Cities, which is part of the German civil society initiative United4Rescue – Gemeinsam Retten e.V., has provided an interesting analysis of dozens of cities across Europe, highlighting innovative and inclusive policies in the field of migration.
It is not surprising that in such a dynamic context, with the increasingly relevant role acquired by municipalities in the migration regime, there has also been an emergence of horizontal collaboration among cities. This has led to the proliferation of city networks – both within and beyond the EU – with a focus on migration, asylum and integration. A remarkable example of this, at the national level, is the French National Association of Welcoming Cities and Territories (ANVITA). At the transnational level, we can point to the Eurocities-based Solidarity Cities, Urbact’s Arrival Cities, Intercultural Cities and the Global Mayoral Forum on Mobility, Migration and Development. Such networks vary significantly in terms of their institutionalisation, membership, goals, functioning and scope. However, as a whole they have enabled municipalities to work more coherently and more closely with each another, while also conducting more effective advocacy and lobbying activities at the national and EU levels.
Civil Society as Mediator
Over the last few years, civil society initiatives have pursued deep change in the governance of migration throughout Europe in different ways and using various tools. Political participation takes on a wide variety of forms, ranging from conventional engagement in advocacy activities to the most disruptive instances of activism.
In such a context, civil society organisations that are capable of finding ways of productive interaction with institutional actors can be of particular significance from the perspective of MEPs, as they will not only be more likely to engage in dialogue, but may also display some shared understanding and common language.
A wide array of actors match this description: from Brussels-based research organisations and think tanks – such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) or the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) – to national and pan-European collectives that have established relationships with sub-national, national, supranational and international institutions – such as Emergency, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Seebrücke among others. Overall, a strongly reformative agenda on migration requires allies who, on the one hand, can be radical enough to bring forward deeply innovative policies and are also acknowledged and trusted by broader civil society sectors (and, clearly, by policy-makers). On the other hand, they also need to be willing and capable to politically engage at an institutional level, translating a plurality of inputs and stances into institutionally-meaningful approaches.
Alliance for what?
Cities and civil society actors can be important allies for those MEPs with an agenda focused on a deep transformation of the EU migration regime, towards a more humane, permissive and international law-compliant policy. The question that remains unanswered, however, is which specific campaigns, policy proposals or simple demands can form the basis of a common objective to be sought after by MEPs, cities and civil society.
When From the Sea To the City (FSTC) was first founded in 2020, the initial five demands of the consortium related to:
• The establishment of a network of cities and CSOs.
• The protection of people on the move’s lives during the Covid-19 crisis.
• Direct access to the management of EU funds.
• The creation of corridors of solidarity towards Europe and forms of relocation from below.
• The protection of fundamental rights.
On the other hand, when the International Alliance of Safe Harbours (IASH) was established in 2021, it had four main demands:
• The enforcement of asylum rights and a ban on camps at the external borders of the EU.
• A system of direct municipal relocation.
• Direct EU funding to municipalities engaged in reception and integration.
• A stop to the criminalisation of solidarity.
These two sets of demands unavoidably present numerous points of contact and overlap, due to the very intrinsic connection between FSTC and the IASH, which mean that they represent the two sides of the same coin. The differences that exist between the two lists are more connected to changes in the political situation during this time period than in the preference of the actors concerned. Generally speaking, in reading the two lists together it can be observed that the main substantive concern of the proponents relates to the protection of the basic rights of people on the move. From our perspective, however, the procedural (i.e. decision-making) demands are even more noteworthy, as they are particularly specific and innovative, while also presenting some potentially interesting policy avenues from a parliamentary perspective. These relate to the establishment of mechanisms of municipal relocation/relocation from below and the direct management of migration/reception/integration funds by municipalities. These two aspects have consistently been further developed by the FSCT/IASH network in more recent years. This has particularly been the case with the discussion of a campaign proposal around the centrality of cities within solidarity and relocation mechanisms (incl. direct relocation and matching), as well as direct access to EU funds and negotiations. On this topic, the recent Strategy paper on municipal relocation in Europe, issued by FSTC on the occasion of the last IASH meeting, stresses the relevance of this approach in order to promote a more humane, sustainable and community-oriented reception of people on the move.
These two procedural elements, which ultimately incorporate cities fully into migration politics and give them more policy responsibility, enable an overall de-centring and democratisation of migration decision-making, creating the conditions for increased citizen participation and for enhanced institutional accountability – based on the proximity of municipal institutions to organised and non-organised civil society. Interestingly, both the campaign proposal (more explicitly) and the strategy paper (in a more nuanced way) express the importance of engaging in this struggle with EU institutions and highlight, in particular, the role that the European Parliament can play.
What the (next) European Parliament can achieve
While cities and civil society have repeatedly shown – and also explicitly stated – their availability to work with MEPs, they have also expressed increasing dissatisfaction with some of the stances adopted by the European Parliament, as well as the initial signs of some mistrust . Although this makes the construction of an alliance between city governments, civil society organisations and MEPs increasingly difficult, it could also be argued that it represents an incentive to take advantage of this precious opportunity to send a clear message by marking a break with previous legislatures and other EU institutions.
Current MEPs and candidates at the next 2024 European elections who intend to deeply reform the existing EU approach to migration in a more open way should consider the opportunities offered by such tripartite alliance. In doing so, they may find it useful to approach those cities and CSOs that are already working together on migration-related issues and explore the possibility of becoming allies.
MEPs can prove their connection with different local contexts and, based on first-hand evidence, increase their knowledge of their needs as well as involving local communities and supporting counter-narratives of a European civil society that is allegedly hostile to migration.
Work carried out by MEPs with diverse civil society initiatives and municipal governments can further encourage inter-institutional and cross-party cooperation, which would undoubtedly be beneficial for an actor, such as the Parliament, which strives to make its voice both heard and reflected in policy outputs.
Lastly, they hold the potential to stimulate the Europeanisation of civil society initiatives engaged in migration issues, strengthening forms of cooperation at the transnational and supranational levels and generally enriching the political arena of the EU.
Federico Alagna is a postdoctoral researcher in political science and political sociology at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy, and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Bologna, Italy. His main research interests are related to EU and Italian migration politics and policy, with a particular focus on civil society actors and on the criminalization of people on the move. He is politically active in the fields of migration and municipalism. In the past, he has also served as Deputy-Mayor for Culture and Public Education of the City of Messina, Sicily.